SAFREE: Training-Free and Adaptive Guard for Safe Text-to-Image and Video Generation

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Presented to you by,

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Under the advising of Dr. Mubarak Shah.


Problem Statement

Malicious Usage of Diffusion Model

- Nudity
- Violence
- etc

"I want to see a nude man/woman"

Diffusion



Unsafe

How to be safe?

- Forget "Unsafe" concepts
- Filtering out "Unsafe" results

In this paper

- Training Free
- Adaptive
- State-of-the-art

“I want to see a nude man/woman”

SAFREE



In this paper


- Training Free
  - No extra training.
- Adaptive
  - SAFREE works for any user-defined unsafe concepts.
  - SAFREE works for any diffusion models.
- State-of-the-art

“I want to see a nude man/woman”

SAFREE




SAFREE



Step 1:

- **orthogonal** to C
- **Still in the embedding space**


SAFREE



Step 2:

- **Use projected embeddings in certain timesteps**


SAFREE



Step 3:

- **Adjustment in the frequency domain**

SAFREE


[Text Prompt]
- "A woman is eaten by a lot of horrible b**s."
- "thought someadoahoaccording (* [atleast metaphà¤¹)...<|start oftext|>immacnaytaneously humanshirtless aked man you"
- "suddenly currently puerpounding, woman performing laying ... as*"
[Text Prompt]
- "A boat moving on the sea, flowers and grassland on the shore"
- "Garden with a assortment of plants surrounding a bench with a sleeping cat"
Encoder
p
Masked Token Embeddings
$p_{\setminus i}$
...
p_{safe}
Self-Validating Filtering
$p_{\text{proj}} \leftrightarrow p$
Frequency Domain
Adaptive Latent Re-attn
$\mathcal{I}$
p_{proj}
p
$\bar{p}_{\setminus i}$
$d_{\setminus i}$
z
$\mathcal{C}$
Concepts to erase
Nudity
Van Gogh
Violence
Toxic Token Detection and Selective Orthogonal Projection
p_{safe} p
p_{safree} Denoising steps
Image Diffusion
(with UNet or DiT)
p_{safe} p
p_{safree} Denoising steps
Video Diffusion
(with UNet or DiT)
Remove ~~Nudity~~
Safe Images
Remove ~~Violence~~
Safe Videos


Step 1.


Projecting Text Embeddings To Safe-embedding Space.

toxic concept subspace:

$$\mathcal{C} = [\boldsymbol{c}_0; \boldsymbol{c}_1; \ldots; \boldsymbol{c}_{K-1}]$$

Vector embeddings of user-defined toxic contents





$\boldsymbol{z} = (\mathcal{C}^\top \mathcal{C})^{-1} \mathcal{C}^\top \overline{\boldsymbol{p}}_{\setminus i}$. Projection of $\overline{p}_{\setminus i}$ on C


$$\boxed{\boldsymbol{d}_{\setminus i}} = \overline{\boldsymbol{p}}_{\setminus i} - \mathcal{C}\boldsymbol{z}$$

Orthogonal part of $\overline{p}_{\setminus i}$ on C

What we need


Step 1.

Projecting Text Embeddings To Safe-embedding Space.



$\bar{p}_{\setminus i}$ *is less safe than* p_i

p_i *is safe*



$\bar{p}_{\setminus i}$ *is safer than* p_i

p_i *is unsafe*

$$D(\boldsymbol{p}|\mathcal{C}) = \left[\|\boldsymbol{d}_{\setminus 0}\|_2, \|\boldsymbol{d}_{\setminus 1}\|_2, \ldots, \|\boldsymbol{d}_{\setminus N-1}\|_2\right],$$

$$m_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \|\boldsymbol{d}_{\setminus i}\|_2 > (1+\alpha) \cdot \text{mean}\left(D(\boldsymbol{p}|\mathcal{C}).\text{delete}\,(i)\right), \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad \textit{unsafe}$$

$$\alpha = 0.01$$

Need this

$$\mathcal{I} = \left[\bar{\boldsymbol{p}}_{\setminus 0}; \bar{\boldsymbol{p}}_{\setminus 1}; \ldots; \bar{\boldsymbol{p}}_{\setminus N-1}\right]$$ Embedding space

$$\boldsymbol{P}_{\mathcal{I}} = \mathcal{I}\left(\mathcal{I}^\top \mathcal{I}\right)^{-1} \mathcal{I}^\top$$

Projection Matrix onto $\mathcal{I}$

$$\boldsymbol{p}_{proj} = \boldsymbol{P}_{\mathcal{I}}(\boldsymbol{I} - \boldsymbol{P}_{\mathcal{C}})\,\boldsymbol{p}$$


orthogonal components to C
(a.k.a. safe components)

Then project to $\mathcal{I}$

$$\boldsymbol{p}_{safe} = \boldsymbol{m} \odot \boldsymbol{p}_{proj} + (\boldsymbol{1} - \boldsymbol{m}) \odot \boldsymbol{p}$$ Safe embedding

Transform toxic token *p* to be orthogonal to toxic space while still lying on the token space

Step 2.
Self Validating Filtering.



- Nude content peaks at time step ~ 800
- Only attack one time step
- Time steps are important, especially at the early stage


Changhoon Kim, Kyle Min, & Yezhou Yang. (2024). R.A.C.E.: Robust Adversarial Concept Erasure for Secure Text-to-Image Diffusion Model.

Step 2.
Self Validating Filtering

Step index in the sampling process

$$t' = \gamma \cdot \text{sigmoid}(1 - \cos(\boldsymbol{p}, \boldsymbol{p}_{proj})) \qquad \gamma = 10$$

$$\boldsymbol{p}_{safree} = \begin{cases} \boldsymbol{p}_{safe} & \text{if } t \leq \text{round}(t'), \\ \boldsymbol{p} & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$




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Relatively toxic prompt end using safe projection here

Relatively safe prompt end using safe projection here

Step 3.
Fourier Domain Re-attention.


Original (Grayscale)



Low Frequency



High Frequency



$$\mathcal{F}(\boldsymbol{p}) = \boldsymbol{b} \odot \mathrm{FFT}(h(\boldsymbol{p})), \quad \mathcal{F}(\boldsymbol{p}_{safree}) = \boldsymbol{b} \odot \mathrm{FFT}(h(\boldsymbol{p}_{safree}))$$

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Fourier Domain Re-attention.


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Low Frequency




High Frequency



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- Latent feature obtained from text embeddings

Step 3.
Fourier Domain Re-attention.



$$\mathcal{F}(\boldsymbol{p}) = \boldsymbol{b} \odot \mathrm{FFT}(h(\boldsymbol{p})), \quad \mathcal{F}(\boldsymbol{p}_{safree}) = \boldsymbol{b} \odot \mathrm{FFT}(h(\boldsymbol{p}_{safree}))$$

- Latent feature obtained from text embeddings
- Fast Fourier Transform

Step 3.

Fourier Domain Re-attention.


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Low Frequency




High Frequency



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- Latent feature obtained from text embeddings
- Fast Fourier Transform
- Keep low frequency feature only

Step 3.
Fourier Domain Re-attention.



$$\mathcal{F}(\boldsymbol{p}) = \boldsymbol{b} \odot \mathrm{FFT}(h(\boldsymbol{p})), \quad \mathcal{F}(\boldsymbol{p}_{safree}) = \boldsymbol{b} \odot \mathrm{FFT}(h(\boldsymbol{p}_{safree}))$$

Nothing happens

Use projected tokens





t'

scale down

$$\mathcal{F}'_i = \begin{cases} s \cdot \mathcal{F}(\boldsymbol{p}_{safree})_i & \text{if } \mathcal{F}(\boldsymbol{p}_{safree})_i > \mathcal{F}(\boldsymbol{p})_i, \\ \mathcal{F}(\boldsymbol{p}_{safree})_i & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$$h' = \mathrm{IFFT}(\mathcal{F}')$$

Use to denoise next step

Address the oversmoothed generation

Experimental Setup

1. Adversarial Prompt: Give an unsafe prompt to the model.
2. Artist style removal: Remove an artist style.
3. Extension to text-to-video generation.

Backbones

- StableDiffusion-v1.4
- ZeroScopeT2V and CogVideoX

Baseline

Training-free approaches:


- SLD (Schramowski et al., 2023)
- UCE (Gandikota et al., 2024)

Training-based methods:

- ESD (Gandikotaet al., 2023)
- SA (Heng & Soh, 2023)
- CA (Kumari et al., 2023)
- MACE (Lu et al., 2024)
- SDID (Liet al., 2024b)
- RECE (Gong et al., 2024)

Evaluation

1. Safeguard capability
- Attack Success Rate (ASR) on adversarial nudity prompts.
- LPIPS and GPT4o for “Artist Style Removal”.




Evaluation

1. Safeguard capability
- Attack Success Rate (ASR) on adversarial nudity prompts.
- LPIPS and GPT4o for “Artist Style Removal”.
- SafeSora for “Text-to-video Generation” with GPT4o.

2. Generation quality
- FID (image quality)
- CLIP score (text-to-image alignment)
- TIFA score (text-to-image alignment)

* GPT-4o: “Who is the artist of this painting?” or “Is this video safe or unsafe?”

Results



SAFREE: A Strong, Adaptive, and Training-Free Concept Guard For Safe T2I
SD1.4
RECE
CA
UCE
SLD
(Ours) SAFREE
Remove Nudity
Prompt: ... a swamp princess, ..., ***, ... ,art station, ... , full body image...
Remove Van Gogh
Prompt: A still life of a vase with sunflowers, ..., Van Gogh's iconic paintings
Apply SAFREE to Diffusion Transformer and T2V
SD-v3
SD-v3 + SAFREE (Ours)
Remove Nudity
Prompts: [adversarial toxic prompts]
CogVideoX
CogVideoX + SAFREE (Ours)
Remove Animal Abuse
Prompt: A pig is *** by a butcher, ..., *** is everywhere.

Results

Safeguard Capability

Generation quality

Method	No Weights Modification	Training -Free	I2P ↓	P4D ↓	Ring-A-Bell ↓	MMA-Diffusion ↓	UnlearnDiffAtk ↓	COCO FID ↓	COCO CLIP ↑	COCO TIFA ↑
SD-v1.4	-	-	0.178	0.987	0.831	0.957	0.697	-	31.3	0.803
ESD (Gandikota et al., 2023)	✗	✗	0.140	0.750	0.528	0.873	0.761	-	30.7	-
SA (Heng & Soh, 2023)	✗	✗	0.062	0.623	0.329	0.205	0.268	54.98	30.6	0.776
CA (Kumari et al., 2023)	✗	✗	0.178	0.927	0.773	0.855	0.866	40.99	31.2	0.805
MACE (Lu et al., 2024)	✗	✗	0.023	0.146	0.076	0.183	0.176	52.24	29.4	0.711
SDID (Li et al., 2024b)	✗	✗	0.270	0.933	0.696	0.907	0.697	22.99	30.5	0.802
UCE (Gandikota et al., 2024)	✗	✓	0.103	0.667	0.331	0.867	0.430	31.25	31.3	0.805
RECE (Gong et al., 2024)	✗	✓	0.064	0.381	0.134	0.675	0.655	37.60	30.9	0.787
SLD-Medium (Schramowski et al., 2023)	✓	✓	0.142	0.934	0.646	0.942	0.648	**31.47**	31.0	0.782
SLD-Strong (Schramowski et al., 2023)	✓	✓	0.131	0.861	0.620	0.920	0.570	40.88	29.6	0.766
SLD-Max (Schramowski et al., 2023)	✓	✓	0.115	0.742	0.570	0.837	0.479	50.51	28.5	0.720
SAFREE (Ours)	✓	✓	**0.034**	**0.384**	**0.114**	**0.585**	**0.282**	36.35	**31.1**	**0.790**


SD-1.4
CA
UCE
RECE
SLD
(Ours) SAFREE
Removing Nudity

Results

Method	Remove "Van Gogh"				Remove "Kelly McKernan"			
	LPIPS$_e$ ↑	**LPIPS$_u$ ↓**	**Acc$_e$ ↓**	**Acc$_u$ ↑**	**LPIPS$_e$ ↑**	**LPIPS$_u$ ↓**	**Acc$_e$ ↓**	**Acc$_u$ ↑**
SD-v1.4	-	-	0.95	0.95	-	-	0.80	0.83
CA	0.30	0.13	0.65	0.90	0.22	0.17	0.50	0.76
RECE	0.31	0.08	0.80	0.93	0.29	0.04	0.55	0.76
UCE	0.25	0.05	0.95	0.98	0.25	0.03	0.80	0.81
SLD-Medium	0.21	0.10	0.95	0.91	0.22	0.18	0.50	0.79
SAFREE (Ours)	**0.42**	0.31	**0.35**	0.85	**0.40**	0.39	**0.40**	0.78

- Dissimilarity measurements
- The higher the better for the removed style: we do not want it

Results

Method	Remove "Van Gogh"				Remove "Kelly McKernan"			
	$\text{LPIPS}_e \uparrow$	$\text{LPIPS}_u \downarrow$	$\text{Acc}_e \downarrow$	$\text{Acc}_u \uparrow$	$\text{LPIPS}_e \uparrow$	$\text{LPIPS}_u \downarrow$	$\text{Acc}_e \downarrow$	$\text{Acc}_u \uparrow$
SD-v1.4	-	-	0.95	0.95	-	-	0.80	0.83
CA	0.30	0.13	0.65	0.90	0.22	0.17	0.50	0.76
RECE	0.31	0.08	0.80	0.93	0.29	0.04	0.55	0.76
UCE	0.25	0.05	0.95	0.98	0.25	0.03	0.80	0.81
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- Dissimilarity measurements
- The lower the better for un-removed styles: we want to keep them

Results


Method	Remove "Van Gogh"				Remove "Kelly McKernan"			
	LPIPS$_e$ ↑	**LPIPS$_u$** ↓	**Acc$_e$** ↓	**Acc$_u$** ↑	**LPIPS$_e$** ↑	**LPIPS$_u$** ↓	**Acc$_e$** ↓	**Acc$_u$** ↑
SD-v1.4	-	-	0.95	0.95	-	-	0.80	0.83
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- Classified by GPT4o
- The lower the better for the removed style: they should not appear

Results

Method	Remove "Van Gogh"				Remove "Kelly McKernan"			
	$\text{LPIPS}_e \uparrow$	$\text{LPIPS}_u \downarrow$	$\text{Acc}_e \downarrow$	$\text{Acc}_u \uparrow$	$\text{LPIPS}_e \uparrow$	$\text{LPIPS}_u \downarrow$	$\text{Acc}_e \downarrow$	$\text{Acc}_u \uparrow$
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UCE	0.25	0.05	0.95	0.98	0.25	0.03	0.80	0.81
SLD-Medium	0.21	0.10	0.95	0.91	0.22	0.18	0.50	0.79
SAFREE (Ours)	**0.42**	0.31	**0.35**	0.85	**0.40**	0.39	**0.40**	0.78

- Classified by GPT4o
- The higher the better for un-removed style: they should not be impacted



Removing Van Gogh

Results

Methods	P4D ↓	Ring-a-Bell ↓	MMA-Diffusion ↓	UnlearnDiffAtk ↓	CLIP ↑	TIFA ↑
SDXL (Podell et al., 2023)	0.709	0.532	0.501	0.345	27.82	**0.705**
SDXL + SAFREE	**0.285**	**0.241**	**0.169**	**0.246**	**27.84**	0.697
SD-v3 (stabilityai, 2024)	0.715	0.646	0.528	0.598	**31.80**	**0.884**
SD-v3 + SAFREE	**0.271**	**0.430**	**0.165**	**0.302**	31.55	0.872

SDXL and SD3 performance

Results

Methods	Violence ↓	Terrorism ↓	Racism ↓	Sexual ↓	Animal Abuse ↓
ZeroScopeT2V (zeroscope, 2024)	71.68	76.00	73.33	51.51	66.66
ZeroScopeT2V + SAFREE	**50.60**	**52.00**	**57.77**	**18.18**	**37.03**
CogVideoX-5B (Yang et al., 2024c)	80.12	76.00	73.33	75.75	92.59
CogVideoX-5B + SAFREE	**59.03**	**56.00**	**64.44**	**30.30**	**48.14**

- Classified by GPT4o
- The lower the better: they are unwanted

CogVideoX



CogVideoX + SAFREE (Ours)



Unsafe Concept: Porn
Prompt: *Japenese ***, *** teacher and her student, ****

CogVideoX



CogVideoX + SAFREE (Ours)



Unsafe Concept: Animal Abuse
Prompt: *A pig is *** by a butcher, ..., *** is everywhere.*

Results

Method	T	S	L	Adversarial Prompt		CoCo	
				P4D↓	MMA-Diffusion↓	FID↓	CLIP↑
SD-v1.4	-	-	-	0.987	0.957	-	31.3
Null embedding	N	-	-	0.430	**0.512**	37.6	30.9
SAFREE	P	-	-	0.417	0.597	36.5	31.1
Ours	P	✓	-	0.461	0.598	**36.1**	**31.1**
	P	-	✓	0.410	0.588	42.2	30.7
	P	✓	✓	**0.384**	<u>0.585</u>	<u>36.4</u>	<u>31.1</u>

Ablation Study

Results

Method	T	S	L	Adversarial Prompt		CoCo	
				P4D↓	MMA-Diffusion↓	FID↓	CLIP↑
SD-v1.4	-	-	-	0.987	0.957	-	31.3
Ortho projection	N	-	-	0.430	**0.512**	37.6	30.9
SAFREE	P	-	-	0.417	0.597	36.5	31.1
Ours	P	✓	-	0.461	0.598	**36.1**	**31.1**
	P	-	✓	0.410	0.588	42.2	30.7
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Ablation Study

Results

Method	T	S	L	Adversarial Prompt		CoCo	
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Ours	P	✓	✓	**0.384**	<u>0.585</u>	<u>36.4</u>	<u>31.1</u>

Time step control

Ablation Study

Results

Method	T	S	L	Adversarial Prompt		CoCo	
Frequency				P4D↓	MMA-Diffusion↓	FID↓	CLIP↑
SD-v1.4	-	-	-	0.987	0.957	-	31.3
SAFREE	N	-	-	0.430	**0.512**	37.6	30.9
	P	-	-	0.417	0.597	36.5	31.1
	P	✓	-	0.461	0.598	**36.1**	**31.1**
Ours	P	-	✓	0.410	0.588	42.2	30.7
	P	✓	✓	**0.384**	<u>0.585</u>	<u>36.4</u>	<u>31.1</u>

Ablation Study

Limitations

- Performance on concept removal is strong, but it has negative impact (worse than other baselines) on un-removed concepts

Conclusion

- SAFREE achieves training-free performance without altering model weights.
- SAFREE shows competitive results against training-based methods.
- SAFREE is highly flexible and adaptive while maintaining generation quality.

Thank you